The security of the zero-knowledge cash system relies on several cryptographic primitives, each with specific security properties and quantum resistance characteristics.
| Cryptographic Primitive | Mathematical Definition | Security Properties | Quantum Resistance |
|---|---|---|---|
| Group G (entropy) | S₀ ⊂ G | DLP hardness, high Rényi entropy | Vulnerable to Shor |
| Homomorphic map φH | S_{i+1} = φH(S_i) | Structure preservation | Depends on group |
| Pedersen Commitment | g^m h^r | Binding, hiding, homomorphic | DLP-based |
| ZK Proof System | (Prove, Verify) | Completeness, soundness, ZK | Protocol dependent |
| Oracle System | TSA signatures | Non-repudiation, time ordering | Signature-dependent |
The commitment scheme is computationally binding under DLP and perfectly hiding thanks to uniformly random r. This provides the foundation for privacy-preserving transactions.
Soundness of proofs relies on the knowledge-of-exponent assumption; simulation uses trapdoor commitments derived from the oracle's CRS.
Group-based protocols face Shor-style attacks. Two mitigations exist:
WalnutDSA and IronwoodKAP provide quantum-resistant alternatives based on group-theoretic constructions that resist Shor's algorithm.
Homomorphic commitments with ZK proofs over modular lattices offer quantum-resistant security without relying on discrete logarithms.
The critical question: Is the potential for "infinite money" sufficient to justify nation-state level resources to break our security assumptions? This analysis examines the economic reality of attacking the M0N3Y Protocol's secure element protections.
If someone could successfully execute perfect rollback attacks or extract data from secure elements, they could theoretically commit unlimited fraud. This creates the "Infinite ROI Problem" - where any finite attack cost becomes economically justified against unlimited potential returns.
The M0N3Y Protocol inherently limits fraud scope through offline transaction limits ($1K-$10K), daily/weekly caps ($5K-$50K), and counterparty availability requirements.
Unlike software exploits, hardware attacks don't scale: each attack targets one specific device, requires physical access, and needs specialized lab facilities.
Cross-party entropy checking, temporal aging, oracle synchronization, and nullifier tracking provide multiple detection mechanisms within 24-72 hours.
| Scenario | Resources | Expected Success | ROI |
|---|---|---|---|
| Criminal Organization | $10-50M budget, 1-2 year timeline | 2-5 successful attacks | Massively negative (-80% to -95%) |
| Nation-State Actor | $100M+ budget, strategic objectives | 10-20 successful attacks over 3 years | Still negative for pure financial motivation |
| APT with Inside Access | $20-100M budget, supply chain access | Higher scale but triggers detection | Limited by countermeasures |
Daily limit: $5,000
Weekly limit: $25,000
Monthly limit: $100,000
Bottom Line: While technically possible, successful attacks against M0N3Y Protocol require:
The economic reality is that even with unlimited potential fraud, the per-attack costs ($171M) and scaling limitations make these attacks economically irrational except for intelligence agencies with strategic (non-financial) objectives.
Security Level: M0N3Y Protocol provides >>10,000x stronger practical security than traditional banking systems, making it suitable for high-value financial applications where security exceeds even current banking standards.
Special thanks to the community members and selfless volunteers who contributed reviews, feedback, and technical insights to make this documentation possible.